Postwar Market for State and Local Government Securities by Roland Robinson
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Postwar Market for State and Local Government Securities





Chapter Title: APPENDIX B Results of Conventional (Nonaccrual) Method
of Computing Interest Cost Which Prevails in Competitive Bidding for
State and Local Government Issues
Chapter Author: Roland Robinson
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2446
Chapter pages in book: (p. 217 - 223)APPENDIX B
Results of Conventional (Nonaccrual) Method
of Computing Interest Cost Which Prevails
in Competitive Bidding for State
and Local Government Issues
INTEREST cost computations are all based in some measure on rules
or No one method can be considered categorically
"right" and all other methods wrong. But in practice it is widely
agreed that the "present value" method of computing the value of
bonds as it is used in preparing bond tables presents a close ap-
proximation to what is normally thought of as interest cost or in-
terest expense.' It is true, of course, that even this method has some
elements of approximation, the greatest one being introduced by
the existence of a term structure of interest rates. For example,
when a bond with its attached coupons is discounted to its present
value, the calculated yield assumes the same rate for discounting
each maturity. But this assumption does some violence to the facts
of the market; sloping yield curves often prevail. However, for
most purposes this flaw is not important so long as both parties
to a transaction in securities understand this fact.
The computation of interest cost made in picking winning bids
for virtually all state and local government bond issues in the
United States, however, is not based on a "present value" type of
computation; it is based on an older formula. This formula will
be demonstrated in detail later in this appendix, but it amounts
to a simple ratio of coupons to principal weighted by the period
the principal is outstanding.
Because such a large proportion of state and local government
securities are in serial form, the persistence of this older form of
computation is understandable. Other rules would make for more
complex calculations. But its existence is largely an anachronism
which often tends to focus attention on the wrong factors. Later
in this appendix we shall argue this point at greater length. At
this juncture it would be better to illustrate this method of corn-
1The"present value" form of calculation isalso sometimes referred to as
the "accrual" or "annuity" method of computing bond values.
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putation and then to study some of its variations in practice. A
hypothetical illustration has been devised and then elaborated to
help in the exposition of this problem (see Table B-i).
TABLE B-i
Hypothetical 1llustration of Conventional (Nonaccrual) Method of
Computing Interest Cost Prevailing in State and Local
Government Borrowing
Part 1. Assume $10,000 borrowed in 1956 to mature in equal
annual instalments of $1,000 over the next ten years and
assume coupons shown in Column 5
. Principal Principal .
Years toMaturing Outstanding Interest
MaturityMaturity
(Assumed)
Each Year for One Year





1957 1 $1,000 $1,000 4 40
1958 2 1,000 2,000 4 80
1959 3 1,000 3,000 4 120
1960 4 1,000 4,000 21/4 90
1961 5 1,000 5,000 21A 112.50
1962 6 1,000 6,000 21/2 150
1963 7 1,000 7,000 2½ 175
1964 8 1,000 8,000 2½ 200
1965 9 1,000 9,000 2½ 225
1966 10 1,000 10,000 2½ 250
Total $55,000 1,442.5
Interestcost computation: $1,442.50÷ $55,000 =2.6227per cent.
Part 1of the illustration sets up the basic circumstances that
might prevail in a very simple and uncomplicated state or local
government financing. To ease the computations, small amounts
have been used and all figures are rounded to the extent possible.
The only departure from utter simplicity is that involved in the
coupon structure assumed. In this case, we have used three dif-
ferent coupon rates. As was developed in Chapter 4 above, such a
coupon system would not be far from those which often prevail:
high for the first few maturities, i.e., 4 per cent; dropping back
to 21/4 per cent in the middle and then up a bit again to 2½per
cent in the later maturities. The so-called interest cost is simply
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the number of dollars that will be paid out as. coupons. The "prin-
cipal outstanding for one year'! is. each. year's' serial obligation,
tiplied by the number of, years. it will :be The, total
of "principal 'outstanding for equivalent of
gle amount if it were at interest for one year.2 The average rate
of interest cost is then simply the interest cost in dollars divided
by the total "principal outstanding for one year." If the bidder
offers a premium, it is deducted from the dollar amount of coupons
before computing the rate of interest cost. This will be illustrated
in later parts.
It should be noted that this form of computation makes no dis-
tinction between a dollar of interest paid during the early years
of the obligation and a dollar of interest paid in the late years
near final maturity. According to a present value basis of compu-
tation, of course, the earlier dollar is worth more and correspond-
ingly "costs" more than a later dollar. This lies back of much of
the complexity in the coupon structures of many state and local
government issues. Most of the sale announcements allow bidders
to name the coupon or coupons to be placed in the proposed issue.
Some invitations allow the bidders to name only one coupon rate;
others permit varying "split coupon" arrangements. Usually only
one coupon can be named for each maturity, but in a few cases
more than one coupon rate for a given maturity is allowed. While
the nonaccrual interest cost computation formula makes no dis-
tinction between early coupon dollars and later ones, the market
does. In all investment markets, including that for state and local
government securities, the conventions of computation are on a
"present value" basis. Underwriters, therefore, can realize more from
the sale of a given dollar volume of coupons on early maturities
(where the discount to present value of the coupon is small) than
for a similar volume of coupons on later maturities. Accordingly,
there is a general disposition for the underwriters to put high
coupons on early issues and lower ones on the longer maturities.
The more this 'is done, the lower the. computed 'interest cost ac-
2Ifthe amounts in each maturity of an issue are equal and the period to
maturity is in whole number digits, then the simple sum of digits formula could




= 55 times $1,000 $55,000.
In practice these assumptions are quite often not true so the more direct even if
more laborious cakulation is usually performed.
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cording to this archaic formula of state and municipal bidding.
It is not a real saving, to the borrowing governments; onlya fic-
tional one. The trouble is that this fiction has even fooledsome
members of the investment banking comñrnnity. They 'speak of
spending tedious hours in the price meetings held by syndicates
working out coupon structures that will "save the borrowinggov-
ernment's money." Nothing is being saved, of course, and the mar-
ket is only being made that much more complex.
This is shown in Part 2 of the hypothetical illustration (see Table
B-2). For the purpose of this part one added assumption has been
made: that of an up-sweeping yield "curve," a straight line in this
case. Three different hypothetical cases are presented. In the first
TABLE B-2
Hypothetical Illustration
Part 2. Same assumptions as in Part 1, with added assumptions about
prevailing yields and different coupon assumptions
CASE 1
Coupon- CASE 2
Prevailing Yield•2.6 Per Cent Coupon CASE 3
Yield InterestInterest CouponInterest
Maturity(Assumed) Cost Cost Price(per cent) Cost Price
1957 2.00 20 26 1,005.90 108.0 1,080 2,039.20
1958 2.10 42 52 1,009.70 0.5 10 968.80
1959 2.20 66 78 1,011.60 0.5 15 950.90
1960 2.30 92 104 1,011.40 0.5 20 931.60
1961 2.40 120 130 1,009.40 0.5 25 911.00
1962 2.50 150 156 1,005.50 0.5 30 889.20
1963 2.60 182 182 1,000.00 0.5 35 866.40.
1964 2.70 216 208 992.80 0.5 40 842.70
1965 2.80 252 284 984.20 0.5 45 818.10
1966 2.90 290 260 974.10 0.5 50 793.00
Total 1,430 1,43010,004.60 1,35010,010.90
. Interest cost computations:
Case 1: $1,430 ÷ $55,000 =2.6per cent (equivalent to "presentvalue" cost).
Case 2:($l,430_$4.60*) ÷ $55,000 =2.5916per cent. .
Case 8:($1,350_$10.90*)$55,000=2.4847per cent.
• Premium.
Cols. 5 and 9 were taken from yield tables using the assumed coupons of the yields applicable
in each case.
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one a different coupon is put on each maturity and the coupon
is made exactly identical to the assumed yield. In other words, these
bonds should all sell exactly at par. This should result in as near
a true interest cost at present value as any case we present here.
In the second case, just one coupon has been attached to the issue,
the coupon which is the average interest cost for the entire issue
according to the computations of case1. Here, the price which
would be realized for each maturity of bond is shown in column 5
of part 2; the total for this column shows that the issue as a whole
would sell for $4.60 more than par. If this $4.60 is deducted from
the interest cost as figured in column 4 (which has the same total
as column 3 but not the same amounts year-by-year), the resulting
computation of interest cost by the conventional formula for award-
ing bids for state and local government bonds ends up slightly
less than that shown in case 1. In other words, with the assumption
of an ascending yield curve, a single coupon gives a computed
lower average interest cost than a coupon fitted exactly to the yields
of the market which is presumably a sort of ideal case in which
present value and interest cost both yield the same results.
But the extreme, and of course unreal, case would be that in
which the coupon cost was moved into the first year as much as
possible and as little as possible was allowed for later years. This
grotesque illustration is case 3. Here a coupon of ½ofIper
cent for the last nine maturities was assumed; the coupon of the
first year was loaded to the point necessary to make the whole
issue sell for more than par, which amount turned out to be the
absurd coupon of 108 per cent per annum. When the computation
of interest cost according to the conventional state and local gov-
ernment formula is made, the presumption of lower cost is striking;
the margin is much more than that which usually separates the
bids of competing buyers.
In practice, of course, the buyers of issues could never go as far
as case 3 assumes. The buyers are usually underwriting groups who
must:sell the obligations to ultimate investors, and ultimate inves-
tors have an understandable reluctance for odd and extreme cou-
A security having a coupon of 108 per cent might be salable
to a commercial bank with a sophisticated investment department
and, what is more important, a sophisticated and understanding
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board. of directors. But there are problems of an. even greater char-
acter in selling long-term bonds even at deep discounts.
For one thing, .as already pointed out in Chapter 6, only the initial
purchaser of these.. bonds can:' use the full yield .forpurposes of
getting an exemption from income taxation; subsequent purchasers
can use only, the coupon. Thus. these bonds are peculiarly unmar-
ketable obligations.
But just the same, the effects of manipulated coupon structures
on the computed interest cost is material; shrewd investment bank-
ers with sharp pencils have found that it is worthwhile to go to
the extra trouble .involvedin marketing these securities with spe-
cial coupons; they can win bids by such devices. Much of the en-
ergy of the great houses which manage the syndicate accounts that
bid for these securities is devoted to just this purpose.
In Part 3 of our hypothetical illustration, we attempt to intro-
duce a note of reality, into our computations (Table B-3). In the
first place, 'the other computations assumed a market yield and
any premium resulting from the "price" calculated in each case
was deducted from the dollar value of the coupons or the interest
cost in dollars in full. In other words, we were making 'no allow-
ance for the margin of the investment banker. In cases '4 and 5
we drop this quite unreal assumption and allow a margin of one
dollar a bond. For case 4 we assume a bidding group that can
market some of the early maturities at a fairly high coupon, but
otherwise they cannot find buyers unless they put on coupons that
will "produce" prices not too far from par. The price(which
multiplied by the dollar amount in each maturity is called the
"production" in underwriting parlance) must yield a little margin
over par since the bidding rules in most cases require a bid of par
or better. and the group must also work out its own margin from
the sale price of the obligations. For the purpose of this case we
have assumed that the second bidding group (case 5) has somewhat
more aggressive salesmen; they figure that they will be able to sell
the early maturities at an even, higher coupon than was estimated
by 'the, first group. .But:their 'real secret 'weapon 'is assumed to ..be
an' advance deal by which they can'. sell' the one longest maturity at
'one 'per cent coupon. They have found one investor who




Part 3. Same assumptions as in Parts 1 and 2, with still
different coupon assumptions and with the further
exception that underwriters bidding for issues are
assumed to retain a profit of one dollar a bond








1957 4 40 1,019.70 5 50 1,029.50
1958 4 80 1,037.00 5 100 1,056.50
1959 4 120 1,052.00 5 150 1,080.90
1960 2¼ 90 998.10 5 200 1,102.60
1961 21/4 112.5 993.00 2½ 125 1,004.70
1962 2½ 150 1,000.00 2½ 150 1,000.00
1963 2½ 175 993.60 2½ 175 993.60
1964 21/2 200 985.70 2½ 200 985.70
1965 2½ 225 976.30 2½ 225 976.30
1966 2½ 250 965.40 ½ 50 793.00
Total 1,442.5 10,020.80 1,425 10,022.80
. Interestcost computations:
Case4:($1,442.50_$10.80*) ÷$55,000 =2.6031per cent.
Case5:($l,425_$12.80*) ÷ $55,000 =2.5676per cent.
* Premiumless underwriters' profit.
The intervening coupon was doubtless arrived at dur-
ing the price meeting of this bidding group at a level which was
figured salable and which would "produce" a price above par for
the whole issue. Using these assumptions, we find that the interest
cost in case 5 is materially below that of case 4.
3Inpractice they probably would have had to offer this one maturity at a
yield considerably higher than the market for a more conventional issue. The
low-coupon terminal maturities are usually not reoffered publicly, but under-
writers report that the effective yield at which these special obligations are sold
is usually from 40 to 60 basis points above a comparable maturity sold at par.
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